This paper examines whether long-term managerial bonus schemes change the allocative behavior of subjects in a laboratory' setting. Using four different compensation schemes, we show that a necessary condition for reconciling divergent lime preferences between principals and agents is a compensation scheme that induces behavior consistent with lower discount rates. Within subject results show that subjais recognize changes across compensation schemes and change their behavior as predicted by formal theor>\ Results also suggest that subjects become more myopic in their investment decisions if compensation contracts are incorrectly structured. (EXPERIMENTAL HCONOMICS. MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION. AGENCY THEORY. LEARNING)
Introduction
Principal-agent models play a pivotal role in the effort to develop an empirically viable theory ofthe firm. The models address the basic question of whether managers take actions to serve their own self-interests or the interests of shareholders. Agency theory recognizes the divergent interests of managers and shareholders, and attempts to align the divergence via contracting schemes. Interests of managers and shareholders can diverge for several reasons.' This paper focuses on divergent discount rates, a divergence that causes stockholders and managers to value current and future profits differently. Because managers often tend to discount the future at a higher rate, they may take actions that are too myopic from the shareholder's perspective. Hence, managers may choose actions that yield flashy short-run profits today, at the expense of long-run profits tomorrow.
Theorists, who believe that managerial behavior is motivated by the structure of incentives, specify the use of compensation contracts to align divergent interests (Dukes etal. 1981 , Horwitzand Kolodny 1981 . Lambert and Larcker 1985 . Firms have heeded this advice, and try to align discount rates with long-term bonus schemes. These schemes tie an agent's compensation to long-term (usually 3-4 years) organizational performance. Long-term bonus schemes are used by 99% ofthe top 200 industrial firms and 95% of the top 20 banks (Sibson & Company 1989) . 73% of these long-term compensation contracts were instituted after 1980, and their usage has steadily increased (O'Dell 1986; Sloan 1991) .
Implicit in normative models, and the empirical use of long-term bonus schemes, is the crucial (and basic) assumption that agent behavior is governed by the structure of compensation contracts. A few empirical studies have tested this assumption using natural data, but they have not been totally successful. The studies did not differentiate between changes in behavior due to contract changes, and changes in behavior due to uncontrolled variables {Lambert and Larcker 1987) . Also, data for key parameters (e.g., utility functions, payoffs) were not available. Hence, how changes in compensation contracts influence decision-making behavior is still a largely unanswered empiiical question.
Despite these problems, testing the association between compensation contracts and behavior seems useful. At best, normative theories only prescribe optimal contract design; the processes of decision-makers recognizing changes and rationally modifying behavior are simply assumed to follow. Given the limitations of natural data, we tested the association in a laboratory setting. In so doing, we are able to provide answers for several implementation issues: Do individuals recognize changes in incentives and modify their behavior to maximize monetary payofls? Behaviorally, are individuals actually calculating the monetary maximizing solution of a compensation contract or do simple heuristics govern their actions? If heuristics are used, do decision rules approach the monetary maximizing solution? Finally, can we recognize compensation contracts that do not reconcile the divergent interests of managers and shareholders?
Our laboratory experiment used students at the Wharton School of Business. Subjects were asked to make investment decisions with scarce resources, a decision environment analogous to that faced by managers. Laboratory compensation contracts were varied to see if changes in contracts induced the predicted changes in decision-making behavior. Our baseline compensation contract was a stylized version ofthe compensation contract of a Fortune 100 firm (Corporation X). Corporation X had recently instituted a longterm bonus scheme whose mechanics were described to us.' The firm hoped the scheme would induce managers to more carefully consider the long-term implications of their decisions. We believed the scheme's design would not change decision-making behavior because it did not affect the discount rate of managers. To show that the discount rate divergence problem is not irreparable, we then devised and tested alternative long-term compensation contracts that induced behavior consistent with lower discount rates.
In summary, our results show that a necessary condition for reconciling the divergent time preferences of shareholders and managers is a compensation contract that effectively induces behavior consistent with lower discount rates. Individuals do recognize changes in compensation contracts, and their behavioral change approximates that predicted by normative models. Few individuals calculate monetary maximizing solutions; instead they rely on simplifying heuristics.
We proceed as follows: §2 discusses Corporation X's incentive scheme and the tradeoffs it offers agents. §3 describes the experimental design. Behavioral predictions are presented in §4 by deriving the monetary maximizing behavior of laboratory subjects under the incentive schemes shown in §2, Hypotheses and resuhs are presented in §5, and conclusions in §6.
Corporation X's Managerial Compensation Contract
The design of Corporation X's compensation contract is similar to that of other firms. A manager's salary is derived from three sources: a base salary, a short-term bonus scheme where bonuses are an increasing function of current business unit performance (call this profit), and a long-term bonus scheme where bonuses are a function ofthe arithmetic mean of profit over the past four periods.
Denote a manager's base salary as B. For expositional simplicity, assume in the shortterm bonus scheme that if T, measures business unit performance in period /. then the period's short-term bonus is S, = CVTT, . where a is a constant of proportionality (i.e., period /'s short-term bonus is proportional to the business unit's performance in period /). Corporation X's long-term bonus in period / is L, ^ ^({TT, + -K,..] + x,-^ + T, .I)/4), Managers at Corporation X told us that their bonus scheme was modelled on the scheme of another Fortune 100 firm. Therefore, we do not believe the sct.eme was lirm specific.
where 0 is also a constant of proportionality.-' Thus, total managerial compensation in period / equals: C, = B, + S, + L, = B,+ ax,+ ^((7r,+ 7r,_i + 7r,_2 + 7r,_3)/4).
Finally, let r' represent the firm's discount factor, as stated by shareholders, and let T^' be the discount factor ofthe manager.** If r' > T^', then the manager discounts the future at a higher rate than shareholders.Â ssume that managerial decisions made in period / and corporate performance in periods / + n are correlated. Then given T'^' and a preference to maximize discounted monetary gains over corporate tenure, a manager chooses a decision set that defines a path of expected business unit profits (whose realizations depend on chance). If T'^' > T'\ then this decision set yields an expected profit path which, when viewed by shareholders, is too high in the present and too low in the future.
Does Corporation X's long-term bonus scheme rectify this situation, i.e., does it induce managers to modify behavior? As we formally see in §4, the answer is no. At best, the present scheme is ineffective because depending upon how the manager perceives the plan, the monetary maximizing manager chooses actions that are either identical to ones made under the short-term plan or are even more myopic (see §4). The reason is simple. Ignoring start-up and terminal problems, any decision set which maximizes the manager's short-term bonus will also maximize the long-term bonus since the latter is simply a weighted average ofthe former. Corporation X's long-term bonus scheme fails to revise tradeoffs between current and future performance beyond that already reflected in the short-term bonus scheme and the manager's own discount rate.
The Purpose of Long-Term Incentive Programs
Theoretically, a successful long-term bonus scheme should alter the manager's perceptions ofthe future, either by revising objective tradeoffs or the subjective discount rate. Corporation X's current long-term bonus scheme does neither. We show this by developing an alternative long-term scheme which does alter perceptions ofthe future, and thus behavior. The rationale and description of our plan is as follows: Assume a manager discounts the future at rate /;. The manager will value future profits less than shareholders if the firm's discount rate is less than p. Firms can reduce p by magnifying or inflating compensation in later periods. For example, firms can make compensation in period ! (t years after joining the firm) a function ofthe discounted present value of profits, discounted back to the initial period at a predetermined rate (T (o does not necessarily have to equal r). For an appropriately chosen range of a. this makes profits earned in later periods relatively more valuable, thus altering the manager's perceptions of future periods. In the manager's mind the tradeoff between short-and long-term performance has changed. Managers now view profits earned today less favorably. Hence, managers should give greater consideration to the long-term consequences of investment and production decisions.
Experimental Design
Laboratory experiments are accepted as a useful and legitimate way to test economic theory {see Smith 1976 Smith , 1982 . The control ofthe laboratory allows the testing of theories ' Of course, profits are not the only index of corporate performance to which bonuses can be linked. The proper index to which to link bonuses depends on the stated goals of each business unit, ''Since Corporation X's compensation contract is only offered to managers whose decisions substantially affect performance, assume units have one manager whose decisions (along with elements of chance) uniquely determine performanee. Of course, this simplifying assumption neglects any organizational decision dynamics.
'The discount "factors" ofthe corporation and its managers are x' = 1/(1 + r) and -'" ^ 1/(1 + p). respectively, where r and p are the discount ""rates" tbey use. for which natural tests are difficult: researchers can design environments that enable them to examine relevant attributes of subjects, specify parameters, and control for individual differences on relevant dimensions (Roth 1985) . As previously noted, little, if any, empirical research sbows that compensation contracts induce individuals to lengthen their decision-making horizon (Lambert and Larcker 1985) . Our experimental design controlled parameters across subjects which enabled us to test the theory's descriptive validity.
Overview ofthe Task
An experiment using four different conditions was run to test the behavioral implications of changes in compensation contracts. Sixty-seven students participated in the experiment. During recruitment, and again before the experiments began, subjects were told that earnings were a function of their decisions. On average, an experiment lasted about 75 minutes and subjects earned $21.84.'' The decision task and procedure were identical across experimental sessions, although payoff structures differed since each condition mimicked a different compensation contract. Subjects were randomly assigned to an experimental session, so any significant difference in behavior across conditions should be due to payoff structures. The experimental design is shown in Table 1 .
Subjects reported to the computer lab and were given written instructions describing the experiment and their decision task (see Appendix A).' An administrator read the instructions aloud and answered any questions; then the session began. Page I ofthe instructions shows the initial computer screen of each subject. The decision task was fairly simple: Subjects allocated 400 "units" over a ten-round decision problem. In round 1 they decided how many units to allocate. This number appeared on the screen in the round 1 decision no. column. They then had 400 minus their round I number to allocate over the 9 remaining rounds. After making their round 1 allocation decision, a subject would press any letter on the keyboard to generate a random number from a uniform distribution whose range was -2 to +2. This number appeared in the round I random no. column. The computer then calculated the square root ofthe decision number, added ' ' We chose to use graduate business students since this is a population of potential corporate managers. We felt that inference made from these subjects would have greater external validity than those made using undergraduates. Most of our subjects had held corporate positions.
Experimenters generally use bland labels. They don't use value-laden terms because these can affect subject behavior through nonmonetar\ preferences.
the random number to it, and entered this amount in the round 1 output column.^ This output was then transformed into a dollar payoff (the transformation was dependent on the contract being tested). Subjects then moved to round 2 where the procedure was the same. Any units remaining after the ninth round were automatically allocated in round 10. After completing ten rounds, subjects were shown their payoffs, and then the computer returned to the initial screen shown in the instructions. Each subject completed 20 iterations ofthe lO-round allocation task. Before the session began, subjects knew how many units they had to allocate, how many rounds they had to allocate, the range ofthe random numbers, and the value ofthe multiplier.
Payoffs
The four experimental sessions differed only with respect to their payoff structure. In all sessions, the output (i.e., the square root ofthe decision number plus the random number) was first multiplied by a number called the "multiplier." Multiplier values were identical across sessions and decreased across rounds. Values are shown in the instructions.
Consider the 400 "units" as an investment input which if spent today will yield payoffs today but if spent tomorrow will yield payoffs tomorrow. The tradeoff for subjects between output today (requiring investment today) and output tomorrow is represented by the multiplier. The multiplier endowed all subjects with an implicit discount rate of 20%. Hence, one unit of output earned in round 1 is worth 5.15 units if compounded over the remaining nine periods, while a unit of output earned in round 5 is worth only 2.48 units compounded over the remaining 5 periods.'' Random elements in the environment are represented by the effect ofthe random number on output. As in the coiporate world, investment decisions are made before seeing the realization of the random variable. Thus, asking subjects to allocate scarce units over the ten decision rounds is similar to asking managers to make investment decisions which yield returns over their tenure horizon.
Session I mimicked salient characteristics of Corporation X's short-term bonus scheme. Earnings in each decision round were simply equal to the total number multiplied by the multiplier. (If output was negative then its value was not multiplied.) Hence, a subject's total earnings were simply the earnings over the ten rounds multiplied by a pre-specified conversion rate.
Session 2 was a laboratory version of Corporation X's existing short-and long-term bonus scheme. Earnings consisted of two components: current round earnings and earnings based on the moving average of output ofthe past 4 rounds.'" The sum of these components was then multiplied by the multiplier for the round.
As previously noted, we hypothesized that subjects' behavior would not change across the two sessions because Corporation X's long-term bonus scheme (Session 2) failed to affect the discount rate of subjects. Sessions 3 and 4 tested alternative incentive schemes which did affect discount rates of subjects, and thus we expected behavior to change. In these sessions we induced behavior consistent with a lower discount rate by using a number called the "magnifier." Output earned in any round was first multiplied by the magnifier, and then by the multiplier. Multipliers were identical to those used in Sessions 1 and 2, and induced a discount rate of 20%. The magnifiers induced behavior consistent W\xh the firm's discount rate. These numbers magnify output earned in later rounds at " The square root ofthe output was used so tbat the output function would be concave and thus exhibit a diminishing marginal product which bounds the optimal amount of units to allocate in any period. If the subject's total number was negative in any round then output was equal to the negative ofthe square root of the absolute value of that negative number. However, at the equilibrium, negative outputs were not possible since at least 4 units were allocated in every period.
' This discounting mechanism was explicitly explained to subjects in the instructions (see Appendix A). '" During the first three periods these means were taken over one. two. and three periods, respectively. a discount rate of a back to the session's first round. To illustrate how this works, assume the firm does not discount the future at all, thus output earned in any period is equivalent to that earned in any other period. If the manager discounted the future at 20% (as our multiplier induces him to do), then by setting a ^ 0.20 (Session 3). we can induce subjects to value output equally across all rounds." In Session 4 we set o ^ 0.08. Here the magnifier does not completely offset the subject's discount rate, thus we expect subjects to allocate units differently relative to Session 3.
Kxperimental Predictions
In this section we present theoretical earnings maximizing solutions to our experiment, which generate behavioral predictions.
Session 1
Risk neutral subjects in Session I faced the following problem:
where e, is an i.i.d. random variable distributed uniformly over the interval [-2, +2] . Since the random term is additive and has a mean of zero, this yields the familiar intertemporal first-order condition:
Subjects should allocate units so their expected discounted marginal product is equal across rounds. Behaviorally, this yields the optimal allocation scheme shown in Table 2 .
Session 2
In Session 2, the perceived maximization problem depends upon how subjects interpret start-up conditions. The long-term bonus scheme equals a four-period moving average of previous outputs. Rules governing the start-up period (years 1-3) can significantly impact investment decisions, especially if the horizon is not long and payoffs are dis-" Note that, in all rounds of Experiment 3, the product of the multiplier and magnifier is constant and equal to 5.15. Hence, output is equally valued across all rounds.
counted. Corporation X used a simple rule: the long-term bonus of a new manager in year 1 equals the short-term bonus for that year. The long-term bonus in year 2 is the mean of the short-term bonus in the first two years, etc. If subjects perceive this start-up condition they will maximize (remembering that t', is additive with a mean of zero):
The first-order conditions can be written as functions of Xi, and satisfy the following set often equations (including the budget constraint). If start-up considerations are not perceived, the problem is transformed into a fictitious "steady state" form and formulated as if ii started in period 4 and continued for ten more periods. More precisely, subjects will maximize
2 A, -400.
(=4 These first-order conditions are identical to those in Session 1 and yield an identical solution. Hence, at best, the laboratory version of Corporation X's long-term bonus scheme should cause behavior identical to that observed in Session 1. Furthermore, if subjects perceive the program in its complete form they will act even more myopically. Table 3 shows the behavioral predictions.
Sessions 3 and 4
In Sessions 3 and 4, subjects should maximize the following objective function:
where p is the induced discount rate, and a is the rate used to alter the discount rate of Note that when p = a (Session 3). an allocation of 40 per round is optimal: When â 0, the first-order conditions are identical to those in Session I. In Session 4, we set a = 0.08. Table 4 shows the behavioral predictions for Sessions 3 and 4.
Summary of Predictions
Predictions of subjects" investment behavior across the four conditions are shown in Tables 2-4 and Figures 1-4 .
Hypotheses and Results

a. Hypotheses
The predictions described in §4 provide testable hypotheses. When testing economic theory with experiments, one can analyze the data on either the individual or aggregate level. Hypotheses testing with individual level data is a stronger test since it requires that all subjects act in strict accordance with the theory. Like most experimental studies, we reject the individual level hypotheses, but find support for aggregate level hypotheses. On average, subjects do behave as predicted by economic theory.
Hypothesis 1 tests the goodness of fit between observed and predicted behavior.
Hypothesis 1. In Sessions 1-4. the observed mean allocation path in the \9th and 2O//7 iterations does not differ from that predicted by the theory.
Hypothesis 2 tests whether the laboratory version of Corporation X's long-term scheme induces subjects to alter their allocation behavior relative to Session 1. The theory predicts that behavior in Session 2 will be identical to that in Session 1 (assuming that subjects ignore start-up and terminal conditions).
Hypothesis 2. Observed investment behavior in Sessions 1 and 2 is identical.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b test the behavioral effect of alternative long-term bonus schemes. Theoretically, the alternative compensation contract offered in Session 3 should change behavior relative to that in Sessions I and 2. The Session 3 contract should induce a zero rate of time preference (the predicted investment path is a constant allocation of 40 units per round). Consequently, behavior in Session 3 should be less myopie than that observed in Session 1: subjects in Session 3 will allocate fewer units in rounds 1-3. more units in rounds 5-10, and a similar number in period 4. See Figures While we summarize results of the 1 st. 10th. and 20th iterations in Table 5 , our statistical tests use pooled data from the 19th and 20th iterations of each session. We do this simply for expositional purposes. The raw data are available from the authors upon request.
Hypothesis I. Because allocations across rounds are not independent (due to the 400 unit constraint), we cannot apply standard goodness-of-fit tests to the data. However, if one considers the predicted investment allocations as a hypothesized distribution function and the observed allocations as an empirical distribution function, we can get some idea for the goodness of fit by applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Basically, this test compares the cumulative distribution functions of the hypothesized and empirical populations. Results show that in all four sessions there are no significant differences between the hypothesized and empirical allocation patterns.'" Visual inspection confirms this finding. Figures 1-4 plot the predicted and mean observed investment allocations in the 19th and 20th iterations of each session. Overall, the pattern of observed allocations is very similar to that predicted by the theory. For example, across the ten rounds, the mean deviation between predicted and observed allocations is 2.9 units in Session 1; 5.0 units in Session 2; 1.8 units in Session 3: and 2.6 units in Session 4. Subjects in Session 2 appeared to perceive the task as a steady state problem: they ignored start-up and terminal conditions. Although mean observed behavior closely follows predicted, there is considerable variance in individual behavior and a tendency for median observed behavior to fall below '^ In fact, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic which measures the maximum deviation between the hypothesized and empirical distributions is very tow in all sessions-0.034 in Session 1. 0.061 in Session 2, 0.022 in Session 3. and 0.030 in Session 4. mean observed behavior. Variance is considerable and does not decrease in later iterations (except in Session 3). Table 5 presents "snapshots" by showing the mean, median and variance of subject behavior in the first, tenth, and twentieth iteration.
This variance around the predicted allocation path may imply that even simple compensation contracts carry an "institutional risk" which must be borne by firms. Even with identical compensation contracts, managerial behavior may vary from firm to firm, or even from plant to plant.
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 predicts that investment behavior will be the same in Sessions 1 and 2. Figures I and 2 show that differences in round-by-round allocations appear small. To determine whether differences are significant, we used a Mann-Whitney-L'test on the round-by-round data ofthe 19th and 20th iterations (Conover 1985) . This test measures whether two populations have locational differences. In the absence of locational differences, it is assumed that the populations are equivalent. Table 6 presents the results. The table clearly shows no significant difference in behavior between any round of the two sessions. Only i z-valuc (round 2) is even above one. The laboratory version of Corporation X's long-term bonus scheme failed to alter investment behavior in Session 2 relative to Session 1. This result was predicted by the theory since the firm's long-term bonus scheme did not fulfill a necessary condition, namely induce behavior consistent with a lower discount rate.
Hypothesis 3a. Hypothesis 3a tests whether a compensation contract that theoretically induces subjects to act as if they have a lower discount rate actually changes behavior. In Session 3 the contract theoretically induces a zero rate of time preference. Hypothesis ! has established that observed behavior was similar to predicted in Sessions 1 and 3. As shown in Table 7 , a Mann-Whitney-C' test on the round-by-round data of the 19th and 20th iterations of Sessions I and 3 confirms that behavior in the two sessions was significantly different. The table clearly shows that observed mean investment allocations in every round are highly significantly different, except round 4 where the theory predicts similar allocations (42.02 in Session 1 and 40 in Session 3). Relative to Session 1, Session 3's compensation contract did significantly alter the investment decisions of subjects and they did act "as if" they had a zero rate of time preference. Hypothesis 3b. Hypothesis 3b predicts that altering the compensation contract by changing o to 0.08 will cause subjects to change their investment behavior in Session 4. As shown by Figures 1, 3 , and 4. the rank order ofthe observed mean allocation paths is as predicted. We analyzed the round-by-round data using two statistical tests: A KruskalWallistest (Table 8) . and a set of pair-wise Mann-Whitney tests between Sessions I and 3, I and 4, and 3 and 4 ( Table 9 ).
The Kruskal-Wallis test determines whether data from different samples can be considered as being selected from a single (combined) sample. Table 8 shows that we ean reject this hypothesis for all rounds except 2. Behavior in Sessions 1. 3. and 4 is significantly different. The pair-wise tests indicate in what rounds these differences appear. Across the three sessions, there is significant differences in observed mean investment strategies except in those rounds where the theory predicts similar allocation strategies. In Sessions 1 and 3, behavior is significantly different in every round except 4. Predicted allocation behavior in round 4 is 42.02 for Session 1 and 40 for Session 3. In Sessions 1 and 4, allocation behavior is similar in rounds 3, 4 and 10. Similar behavior in rounds 3 and 4 is expected since predicted allocation in these rounds is 60.52 and 42.02 for Session 1 and 56.8 and 46.0 for Session 4. Similar allocation bebavior in round 10 was not expected. Allocation behavior is significantly different in all rounds of Sessions 3 and 4 except round 5. This was expected since the predicted allocation behavior is 40 in Session 3 and 37.2 in Session 4.
Hence, differences in compensation contracts across the 3 sessions did apparently change the investment behavior of subjects. The change in bebavior was as predicted by theory. Subjects in the 3 sessions did act as if their discount rates were inherently different.
Within Subject Behavior. The analyses above bave examined bebavior between subjects. We have not examined whether a subject will change her behavior when given a different compensation contract. To test within subject behavior, we randomly selected 8 subjects from Sessions 2 and 4 and asked them to perform the allocation task again. We kept them in the laboratory, and publicly read tbem tbe instructions again, Tbe only difference in the instructions was tbe payofl'structure. So 8 subjects wbo participated in Session 2 were then given tbe instructions (and payoff structure) for Session 4: and 8 subjects who participated in Session 4 were given the instructions for Session 2.
There was no significant difference in tbe investment behavior of the 16 subjects wbo only participated in Session 2 and the 8 subjects wbo first participated in Session 4, and then in Session 2. The same was true for tbe bebavior of only Session 4 subjects and the 8 subjects who first participated in Session 2. However, tbe mean allocations of both groups of 8 were significantly different when compared across experimental conditions. Subjects did change tbeir behavior when they were given a different compensation contract. And their behavior changed as predicted by the theory: Subjects wbo first participated in Session 2 and then in Session 4 allocated fewer units in early rounds and more in later rounds in the latter session. Subjects who first participated in Session 4 and then in Session 2 did tbe opposite.
Myopic Behavior. One objective of our experiment was to determine whether changes in compensation contracts would alter the myopic behavior of subjects, and if so by how much. To do this, we define myopia, in the context of our experiment as follows:
DEFINHION. Subject A is more myopic tban subject B if: I^.dt)> Fad), for round t ^ 1,2 10 where: Flit) and FB(/) are the cumulative amount of units (cumulative mean amount of units) allocated by subjects/i and B, respectively, by round /.
Hence, if one subject or group of subjects has a cumulative distribution of units which is everywhere above tbe cumulative distribution of another subject or group of subjects, we say tbe former is more myopic.
Call M, our myopia measure for Session /, i = I. 2, 3. 4. Then given our bonus schemes, the predicted myopia ordering is MI ---M2> M4> M^. We test this by plotting the cumulative distributions of mean investment allocations in the 19th and 20th iterations of Sessions I, 2, 3, 4 ( Figure 5 ).
Observed myopia orderings are as predicted: Subjects in Session 1 are the most myopic, followed closely by subjects in Session 2, and then by subjects in Sessions 4 and 3.
Learning. One interesting question that remains is whether subjects accumulate knowledge during the session. To investigate this, we examine the observed mean cumulative allocative distributions across sessions in the 1st, 10th and 20th iterations (Figures 6-9) .
In Sessions 1 and 2, subjects appear to become more myopic over time. That is. in botb sessions, the cumulative unit distributions of the 1st iteration is everywhere below that of the 10th iteration, which is below (or equal) that of the 20th iteration. Hence, by definition, compensation contracts in Sessions 1 and 2 motivated subjects to become more myopic. This is not surprising since both contracts theoretically reward myopic behavior. In Sessions 3 and 4 compensation contracts do not reward myopia, and myopic behavior does not increase. While subjects may have an initial level of myopia, this myopia tends to slightly increase by iteration 10 and then decreases by iteration 20. These results suggest that if reward structures in compensation contracts encourage myopic behavior, then individuals do become more myopic. Firms that institute contracts which reward myopic behavior (i.e.. Corporation X) will exacerbate potential agency problems, and may induce lower corporate performance.
Discussion and Conclusions
The development ofan empirically valid theory ofthe firm requires an understanding of compensation contracts and their effect on managerial decision-making. Normative incentive models assume that conditions in contracts influence investment and production behavior; however this hypothesis has virtually no empirical support. Our findings support the hypothesis: subject behavior was significantly modified when the theory predicted it would be. In our sessions, changes in compensation contracts caused subjects to lengthen their decision-making horizons. These results suggest that compensation contracts can align divergent time preferences when bonus schemes induce managerial behavior that is consistent with lower discount rates. Because managers maximize their discounted earnings through corporate actions, correctly constructed compensation contracts can induce managers to maximize preferences of shareholders.
Admittedly, principal-agent contracting settings are complex and many factors affect behavior. Our laboratory design was a simple abstraction ofthe corporate decision-making environment. External validity questions remain unanswered and we view results as suggestive. The sessions were designed to test the descriptive validity of the underlying theory. They suggest how individuals would react to changes in compensation contracts. Some field work does support our results. Larcker (1983) examined whether changes in compensation schemes were associated with changes in managerial behavior. Specifically, he looked at the association between the adoption of long-term compensation schemes and increases in corporate capital investment. Results indicate that, after firms adopted such schemes, managers significantly increased capital investment expenditures. The sessions also allowed us to more closely examine how individuals adapt to changes in compensation contracts. While subjects behaved as predicted, few, if any, were making the necessary calculations to maximize monetary gain.'^ Yet, on average, subjects acted as //they were making the calculations. We surveyed subjects at the conclusion of each session. One question asked them to describe their investment allocation strategy. Many replies mirrored the intuition underlying the mathematics. Subjects chose decision heuristics which behaviorally approximated the normative solution. Some examples were as follows:
"I'd allocate units using a tapered strategy-with more allocated at the beginning."
Although, subjects had the required information and were provided with calculators.
"Fd allocate a slightly decreasing number of units each round. I'd start at 90 units and end with 5 in round 10." 'Td start by designating a high number of units in round 1 (usually 115) and then gradually decrease the number of units over the remaining rounds. I'd try to leave 10 units for the last round." (a subject in Session 3) "40 units in each round seemed to be the most effective strategy, although 1 did try others." Subjects appeared to experiment with various heuristics and then chose the one that worked best {i.e.. maximized monetary earnings).
Learning did occur. When we asked subjects whether their investment allocation strategy was the same in iteration 20 as in iteration 1, 94% said their strategy changed. This result reinforces the idea that individuals do not calculate the maximizing monetary solution, but instead experiment with various strategies. They arrive at an optimal strategy through trial and error. Hence, it seems reasonable to expect that in scltings with long learning periods (like corporations) individuals will adapt to compensation changes and change their behavior accordingly.
Finally, laboratory experiments may prove a practical way for firms to test compensation contracts before their implementation. Presently, few contracts are pre-tested because testing methods are not available. A badly designed contract can be very costly, both in terms of firm performance and managerial salaries. Conducting a "test" contract within the firm is also costly in terms ofthe required testing period and implementation issues. The relative small cost and time involved in laboratory testing seem cost effective.'" '•"This project was funded in part by grants from the New York University Fund to develop University/ Industry Linkages, and the Reginald Jones Center for Management Policy. Strategy, and Organization. Other research support was offered by the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University and David Hauck. We would like lo thank Clivc Bull for advice in early stages of this project's development and David Larcker and two anonymous referees for their comments. Our thanks to Ionnis Loumakis for his programming assistance and Ken Rogoza for his research assistance. 
Instructions
This is an experiment in decision making. Various research institutions have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash.
Experimental Procedure Your Computer Screen:
As you sit down at your computer terminal, the screen will contain the following 
Your Task
In the experiment, you will perform a simple task. You have been endowed with 400 units, and must allocate all 400 units over the 10 rounds of the experiment. The number of units that you choose to allocate for any specific round will be called your decision number for that round. For example, in round 1 you can choose to allocate any number of units between 0 and 400. Say you decide to allocate 20 units in round I. Your decision number for round I is then 20. In round 2, you can now allocate any number of units between 0 and 380 {your beginning endowment of 400 minus the units allocated in round 1). Note that all 400 units must be allocated over the 10 rounds. To choose a decision number for round I. the computer will ask you on a prompt line below this table to type in a decision number. Do so by typing any number between 0 and 400 and then hitting Ihe return key.
The computer will then ask you to verify your decision number by stating: Is -your decision number (y/n)? If it is, type y; if not, type n and then enter another number and hit return again. You will tben be asked to verify your corrected decision number. Once your number is verified, it will appear in the Decis# column, row I of the table.
Random Number
After you have chosen a decision number for round I, the computer will help you generate a random number for that round by asking you to hit any key on the keyboard. By hitting such a key you will cause the computer to display a random number between -2 and +2 in the random column. This number is generated randomly in such a way that each integer between -2 and +2 has an equally likely chance of occurring.
Look at the attached worksheet. This sheet shows you the square root of integers between 0 and 400. The computer will calculate the square root of your decision number and add it to your random number. The sum of tbese numbers (the random number and the square root of your decision number) is then displayed in the output column.
Note that your total number may be negative. This will occur whenever your random number is negative, and greater than the square root of your decision number. For instance, if you allocale 2 units in a round, and draw a random number of -2, then your total number in that round will be -0.6 (1,4-2), and your output will be -0.6. Finally, the computer will subtract your decision number (Decis# column) from your initial endowment of 400. It will then tell you how many remaining units you have at the bottom of the screen. Round I is now over, and you can move on to round 2.
Round 2 proceeds in a similar manner. Your remaining endowment is given at the bottom of the screen. Your decision number for round 2 can be any amount of units between 0 and the number shown at tbe bottom of the screen. Choose another decision number and generate a random number. Tbe computer will calculate tbe square root of your decision number, add it to your random number and record the sum in row 2, tbe output column. Your remaining number of units will then be displayed at the bottom of the screen. We will do tbis lor !() rounds. If at any round you bave allocated all your 400 units, then you must consider your decision number to be 0. The computer will automatically place 0"s in tbe remaining rounds.
Payoffs
The determination of your payoffs is quite slraigbtforward. At the end of eacb round your output (output column) is placed in a riskless asset earning 20% interest, compounded at the end of each remaining round of the experiment. For instance, output earned in round 1 will be compounded at 20% interest for 9 rounds, while output earned in round 5 will be compounded at 2(Y?o interest for 5 periods. To illustrate how mucb compounding is wortb look at the Multiplier column. This column tells you bow many times your units multiply if you let them compound over various periods of time. We will call tbese numbers your multiplier factor. Notice tbat the effects of compounding can be dramatic. For instance, 10 units of output earned in round I is worth 5L5 wben compounded at 20% over the 9 remaining rounds. The same number ol" units earned m round 5 is worth only 24,8 units, or 2.48 times its initial value. Note tbat the multiplier factor for round 7 drops to 1.72. For 10 units earned in round 7 the compounded value would be only 17.2 units.
Hence, units allocated in early rounds contribute more to your earnings. However, there is a tradeoff. Tbe attached worksheet shows tbat as your decision number increases, its square root increases at a decrea.sing rate. For example, while the square root of 100 is 10. the square root of 400 is only 20. Because of the diminishing rate of increase, there is a tradeoff in allocating your units. The more you allocate in an early round, the greater is the multiplier effect. However, because of the diminishing rate of increase, the less eacb additional unit allocated increases your output in that round.
At ibe end of each round the computer will multJDly your output for that round (output column) by the relevant multiplier (multiplier column) and record this product in the Earnings column. If in any round your output (output column) is negative, tben tbe computer will record this amount as your total earnings (earnings column), i.e., losses are not compounded.
You will be paid in the following manner. First, the computer will add up the sums of your compounded earnings. It will divide this total by 300 and multiply this sum by $1.00. You will be paid this amount when you leave. We will perform this 10-round task 20 times in succession. Your final payulTwill be the sum of your payoffs in each ofthe 20 10-round experiments. At the end of each 10-round session, the computer will tell you your earnings for that session, and your total earnings so far. You are free to make as much money as possible. Are there any questions?
